David Anderson is principal of David Anderson & Associates, a Philadelphia forensic accounting firm that provides a full range of fraud investigation, forensic accounting, and marital dissolution services in Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley.

While most sales transactions today involve an electronic or paper check payment, there still are numerous businesses that largely deal with cash payments, including cannabis operations, casinos, retailers in low-income areas, food trucks, and small food operations (such as water ice or pretzel carts). For such businesses, the risks of fraud due to diversion of cash are much higher than those of businesses that deal primarily with electronic (including credit card) or paper check payments.

Fraud from Moment of Sale to Internal Depository

Cash can be diverted between the moment of sale and the business’s internal depository (typically a safe or locked cabinet) in a variety of ways. These include:

• The employee receiving the cash payment from the customer can just pocket the money, and not leave the business with any documentation evidencing the customer’s payment; or
• The employee receiving the cash payment can prepare a manual receipt for the customer (either not numbered or numbered but not controlled), place the cash receipt in a register drawer, and later remove both the cash and any copy of the cash receipt before the register drawer is removed and counted; or
• The employee who removes and counts the register drawer can remove both the cash and any copy of the cash receipt before counting and recording the cash in the register drawer and placing it in the internal depository.

Safeguards to protect against the above types of diversion include:

• Use of video surveillance;
• Use of point-of-sale systems to record all sales;
• Use of numbered and controlled manual cash receipt books (with duplicates);
• Removal and counting of cash register drawers under management supervision;
• Regular management review of sales transactions.

Fraud Between Internal Depository and Actual Deposit of Cash into a Bank

Cash also can be diverted between the time it is placed in the internal depository and the time it is deposited in the bank. These diversions can be accomplished by:

• An employee who can prepare and record bank deposits, and who also performs bank reconciliations, can remove cash from the internal depository, record a bank deposit for the amount removed, and “adjust” the bank reconciliation to hide the fact that no bank deposit was made.
• Alternatively, an employee who can initiate and record credit memos (and who also has access to the internal depository) can remove cash from the internal depository and process a credit memo against customer sales to “account” for the shortfall in cash.
• Also, for a business that does not or cannot use bank accounts (such as cannabis operations), an employee with access to the internal depository simply can remove cash from the internal depository.

Safeguards to protect against the above types of diversion include:

• Use of video surveillance;
• Separation of duties so that no employee who prepares bank deposits makes bank deposits and that no employee who performs bank reconciliations or initiates credit memos can record deposits or access cash in the internal depository;
• Regular and timely reconciliation of bank accounts; and
• Performance of regular (even daily) cash counts of the contents of the internal depository under management supervision.

Fraud Involved with Cash Disbursements

Cash also can be diverted as part of the disbursement process when it is used to pay employees, vendors, and others. These circumstances occur in businesses that do not or cannot use bank accounts (again, cannabis operations). These diversions can be accomplished by:

• An employee in charge of processing cash disbursements creates a non-existent vendor, creates phony invoices, and “pays” himself/herself the amount on the invoices.
• An employee in charge of processing cash disbursements for inventory or supplies arranges to return certain delivered inventory or supplies to the vendor but “pays” the original vendor invoice to himself/herself. He/she then pays the vendor the revised (lower) vendor invoice amount, keeping the difference between the two vendor invoices.
• An employee in charge of processing payroll creates a non-existent employee, and “pays” himself/herself the payroll amount.
• An employee in charge of processing expense reimbursements creates either non-existent expense documentation (such as getting fake receipts from http://salesreceiptstore.com/) or makes copies of previously submitted expense documentation, and “pays” himself/herself.

Safeguards to protect against the above types of diversion include:

• Use of video surveillance.
• Separation of duties so no employee who processes cash disbursements can create a vendor or employee or return inventory or supplies. Additionally, such employee cannot hand out payroll payments to employees.
• Management approval of all vendor invoices, expense reimbursements, and employee payroll.
• Performance of regular (even daily) cash counts of the contents of the internal depository under management supervision.

The potential cash diversion risks and safeguards discussed above are not all-encompassing but are meant to provide examples. The actual cash diversion risks and safeguards to prevent them are dependent upon the specific circumstances present in the business.

Additionally, very small businesses (as well as smaller non-profit organizations such as sports league snack stands and smaller houses of worship) may not be able to afford video surveillance and may not have enough staff to facilitate the separation of duties discussed above. In such cases, more management oversight would be necessary to offset these shortcomings.

If you want to learn more about how to prevent fraud in your cash operations, a Certified Fraud Examiner from an experienced firm that provides forensic accounting services in Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley can help. For details, contact the Philadelphia forensic accounting firm of David Anderson & Associates by calling David Anderson at 267-207-3597 or emailing him at david@davidandersonassociates.com.

About David Anderson & Associates

David Anderson & Associates is a Philadelphia forensic accounting firm that provides a full range of forensic accounting services in Philadelphia and the Delaware Valley. The experienced professionals at David Anderson & Associates provide forensic accounting, business valuation, fraud investigation, fraud deterrence, litigation support, economic damage analysis, business consulting and outsourced CFO services. Company principal David Anderson is a forensic accounting expert who has more than 30 years of experience in financial and operational leadership positions and is a Certified Public Accountant, a Certified Fraud Examiner, and a Certified Valuation Analyst.